1 // Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. 2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style 3 // license that can be found in the LICENSE file. 4 5 /* 6 Package template (html/template) implements data-driven templates for 7 generating HTML output safe against code injection. It provides the 8 same interface as package text/template and should be used instead of 9 text/template whenever the output is HTML. 10 11 The documentation here focuses on the security features of the package. 12 For information about how to program the templates themselves, see the 13 documentation for text/template. 14 15 Introduction 16 17 This package wraps package text/template so you can share its template API 18 to parse and execute HTML templates safely. 19 20 tmpl, err := template.New("name").Parse(...) 21 // Error checking elided 22 err = tmpl.Execute(out, data) 23 24 If successful, tmpl will now be injection-safe. Otherwise, err is an error 25 defined in the docs for ErrorCode. 26 27 HTML templates treat data values as plain text which should be encoded so they 28 can be safely embedded in an HTML document. The escaping is contextual, so 29 actions can appear within JavaScript, CSS, and URI contexts. 30 31 The security model used by this package assumes that template authors are 32 trusted, while Execute's data parameter is not. More details are 33 provided below. 34 35 Example 36 37 import "text/template" 38 ... 39 t, err := template.New("foo").Parse(`{{define "T"}}Hello, {{.}}!{{end}}`) 40 err = t.ExecuteTemplate(out, "T", "<script>alert('you have been pwned')</script>") 41 42 produces 43 44 Hello, <script>alert('you have been pwned')</script>! 45 46 but the contextual autoescaping in html/template 47 48 import "html/template" 49 ... 50 t, err := template.New("foo").Parse(`{{define "T"}}Hello, {{.}}!{{end}}`) 51 err = t.ExecuteTemplate(out, "T", "<script>alert('you have been pwned')</script>") 52 53 produces safe, escaped HTML output 54 55 Hello, <script>alert('you have been pwned')</script>! 56 57 58 Contexts 59 60 This package understands HTML, CSS, JavaScript, and URIs. It adds sanitizing 61 functions to each simple action pipeline, so given the excerpt 62 63 <a href="/search?q={{.}}">{{.}}</a> 64 65 At parse time each {{.}} is overwritten to add escaping functions as necessary. 66 In this case it becomes 67 68 <a href="/search?q={{. | urlescaper | attrescaper}}">{{. | htmlescaper}}</a> 69 70 where urlescaper, attrescaper, and htmlescaper are aliases for internal escaping 71 functions. 72 73 For these internal escaping functions, if an action pipeline evaluates to 74 a nil interface value, it is treated as though it were an empty string. 75 76 Namespaced and data- attributes 77 78 Attributes with a namespace are treated as if they had no namespace. 79 Given the excerpt 80 81 <a my:href="{{.}}"></a> 82 83 At parse time the attribute will be treated as if it were just "href". 84 So at parse time the template becomes: 85 86 <a my:href="{{. | urlescaper | attrescaper}}"></a> 87 88 Similarly to attributes with namespaces, attributes with a "data-" prefix are 89 treated as if they had no "data-" prefix. So given 90 91 <a data-href="{{.}}"></a> 92 93 At parse time this becomes 94 95 <a data-href="{{. | urlescaper | attrescaper}}"></a> 96 97 If an attribute has both a namespace and a "data-" prefix, only the namespace 98 will be removed when determining the context. For example 99 100 <a my:data-href="{{.}}"></a> 101 102 This is handled as if "my:data-href" was just "data-href" and not "href" as 103 it would be if the "data-" prefix were to be ignored too. Thus at parse 104 time this becomes just 105 106 <a my:data-href="{{. | attrescaper}}"></a> 107 108 As a special case, attributes with the namespace "xmlns" are always treated 109 as containing URLs. Given the excerpts 110 111 <a xmlns:title="{{.}}"></a> 112 <a xmlns:href="{{.}}"></a> 113 <a xmlns:onclick="{{.}}"></a> 114 115 At parse time they become: 116 117 <a xmlns:title="{{. | urlescaper | attrescaper}}"></a> 118 <a xmlns:href="{{. | urlescaper | attrescaper}}"></a> 119 <a xmlns:onclick="{{. | urlescaper | attrescaper}}"></a> 120 121 Errors 122 123 See the documentation of ErrorCode for details. 124 125 126 A fuller picture 127 128 The rest of this package comment may be skipped on first reading; it includes 129 details necessary to understand escaping contexts and error messages. Most users 130 will not need to understand these details. 131 132 133 Contexts 134 135 Assuming {{.}} is `O'Reilly: How are <i>you</i>?`, the table below shows 136 how {{.}} appears when used in the context to the left. 137 138 Context {{.}} After 139 {{.}} O'Reilly: How are <i>you</i>? 140 <a title='{{.}}'> O'Reilly: How are you? 141 <a href="/{{.}}"> O'Reilly: How are %3ci%3eyou%3c/i%3e? 142 <a href="?q={{.}}"> O'Reilly%3a%20How%20are%3ci%3e...%3f 143 <a onx='f("{{.}}")'> O\x27Reilly: How are \x3ci\x3eyou...? 144 <a onx='f({{.}})'> "O\x27Reilly: How are \x3ci\x3eyou...?" 145 <a onx='pattern = /{{.}}/;'> O\x27Reilly: How are \x3ci\x3eyou...\x3f 146 147 If used in an unsafe context, then the value might be filtered out: 148 149 Context {{.}} After 150 <a href="{{.}}"> #ZgotmplZ 151 152 since "O'Reilly:" is not an allowed protocol like "http:". 153 154 155 If {{.}} is the innocuous word, `left`, then it can appear more widely, 156 157 Context {{.}} After 158 {{.}} left 159 <a title='{{.}}'> left 160 <a href='{{.}}'> left 161 <a href='/{{.}}'> left 162 <a href='?dir={{.}}'> left 163 <a style="border-{{.}}: 4px"> left 164 <a style="align: {{.}}"> left 165 <a style="background: '{{.}}'> left 166 <a style="background: url('{{.}}')> left 167 <style>p.{{.}} {color:red}</style> left 168 169 Non-string values can be used in JavaScript contexts. 170 If {{.}} is 171 172 struct{A,B string}{ "foo", "bar" } 173 174 in the escaped template 175 176 <script>var pair = {{.}};</script> 177 178 then the template output is 179 180 <script>var pair = {"A": "foo", "B": "bar"};</script> 181 182 See package json to understand how non-string content is marshaled for 183 embedding in JavaScript contexts. 184 185 186 Typed Strings 187 188 By default, this package assumes that all pipelines produce a plain text string. 189 It adds escaping pipeline stages necessary to correctly and safely embed that 190 plain text string in the appropriate context. 191 192 When a data value is not plain text, you can make sure it is not over-escaped 193 by marking it with its type. 194 195 Types HTML, JS, URL, and others from content.go can carry safe content that is 196 exempted from escaping. 197 198 The template 199 200 Hello, {{.}}! 201 202 can be invoked with 203 204 tmpl.Execute(out, template.HTML(`<b>World</b>`)) 205 206 to produce 207 208 Hello, <b>World</b>! 209 210 instead of the 211 212 Hello, <b>World<b>! 213 214 that would have been produced if {{.}} was a regular string. 215 216 217 Security Model 218 219 https://rawgit.com/mikesamuel/sanitized-jquery-templates/trunk/safetemplate.html#problem_definition defines "safe" as used by this package. 220 221 This package assumes that template authors are trusted, that Execute's data 222 parameter is not, and seeks to preserve the properties below in the face 223 of untrusted data: 224 225 Structure Preservation Property: 226 "... when a template author writes an HTML tag in a safe templating language, 227 the browser will interpret the corresponding portion of the output as a tag 228 regardless of the values of untrusted data, and similarly for other structures 229 such as attribute boundaries and JS and CSS string boundaries." 230 231 Code Effect Property: 232 "... only code specified by the template author should run as a result of 233 injecting the template output into a page and all code specified by the 234 template author should run as a result of the same." 235 236 Least Surprise Property: 237 "A developer (or code reviewer) familiar with HTML, CSS, and JavaScript, who 238 knows that contextual autoescaping happens should be able to look at a {{.}} 239 and correctly infer what sanitization happens." 240 */ 241 package template 242